鉴于中国对意大利足球在上世纪八十，九十年代就建立了深厚的情感基础，并始终对意大利足球抱持积极态度，中国投资者对这些俱乐部表现出兴趣并不让人感到意外。

不过，这些推测都诞生于中国投资者和企业家们对欧洲俱乐部的一系列收购之后。其中最值得关注的收购也许是华人文化收购曼城母公司13%的股份，以及万达公司收购马德里竞技20%的股份。此外，也包括对西班牙人和荷兰海牙ADO俱乐部的完全收购等。AC米兰或国际米兰确有可能成为下一个目标。

由于中国正在努力实现其体育行业的发展愿景及足球目标，我们在未来很有可能看到更多针对欧洲俱乐部的收购。原因显而易见：在一个层面上，欧洲足球俱乐部可以是个产生收益的投资机会。在另一层面上，收购一家俱乐部有助于提升业务组合的多样性，尤其非常适合作为中国大娱乐产业中的一环。

▲ 来自中国的资本已经和英超曼城俱乐部有了紧密联系。

收购一家俱乐部同样会成为汲取商业理念，提升竞争力以及获取知识的良好来源。如果中国的俱乐部希望学习如何考察球员的天分，建设自己的市场部门，了解赞助合同如何运作，吸引球迷并建设令人兴奋的体育场馆等基础设施，那么投资一家欧洲俱乐部并从中汲取新知识就显得是顺理成章的事情。

但收购一家欧洲俱乐部并非易事，它需要专业的商业知识，欧洲各地的俱乐部所有权模式不尽相同，受到各国不同的俱乐部所有权规则管理。此外，投资者还需知道国际足联，欧足联或欧盟对于俱乐部所有权问题没有明确的方针。

以英格兰为例，在过去十年间，国外投资者收购了包括曼联，曼城，切尔西，阿森纳、利物浦在内的多家俱乐部，俱乐部价值也大幅提升。而大多数英格兰俱乐部都以私人有限公司形式构成，即俱乐部股份可以被一小群人买入或出售。

这意味着英格兰俱乐部相对更容易被收购，需要的只是合理的报价并且说服现在的俱乐部拥有者出售其股份。理论上，如果一个收购者未能通过资格考核，其对英格兰俱乐部的收购将会被终止或延期。这一考核保证了俱乐部未来的拥有者确实拥有足够的财务资源来购买并运营一家足球俱乐部。

对于资格考核的批评一直存在，尤其是对杨家诚收购伯明翰一事。杨通过了考核，后来却因洗钱犯罪被香港警方逮捕。资格考核的说服力因此受到公开质疑。

相比英格兰，德国的规定要更加复杂和严格。实际上，由于德国足球俱乐部所有权规则的限制，中国投资者目前还不能完全收购德国俱乐部。特别是50+1政策，规定俱乐部的大部分股份必须留在球迷手中。

德国因其注重球迷利益和民主权力的做法而被树立为足球管理的良好典范。不过，随着一些欧洲国家的俱乐部在海外投资者资金的支持下大步向前迈进，德国国内已经开始质疑这样的所有权模式是否明智。规则上的变化并非近在眼前，但仍值得投资者们保持关注。

西班牙足球的运作系统看起来像是英格兰和德国俱乐部所有权模式的混合：一部分俱乐部是私有的，因此近期有卡塔尔和中国投资者分别收购马拉加与西班牙人两家俱乐部。其他俱乐部，如皇家马德里和巴塞罗那，则采取会员制，即俱乐部所有权属于每年单独缴纳会员年费的球迷们。

皇马和巴萨的情况短期内可能不会有变化，因为两家俱乐部都将“球迷拥有俱乐部”这一条写进了俱乐部章程。任何章程的变化都需要球迷进行投票，何况这可能会带来各种各样的法律问题。此外，以巴塞罗那为例，俱乐部常被当作民主和良好管理的典范，我们在未来一段时间里看到红蓝之师所有权变更的机会微乎其微。

投资者还要谨记的是，西班牙俱乐部的所有权与政治密切相关，并常与西班牙地方主义及动荡的历史相联系。因此，了解西班牙的社会文化情况，对任何希望购买西班牙俱乐部股份的投资者来说都是必要的。

▲ 中国万达集团入股西甲球会马德里竞技。

意大利的情况与英格兰相似，不同于德国与西班牙。球迷拥有俱乐部所有权在意大利并不常见。相反，意大利足球俱乐部的所有权历来为具有工业背景的家族所掌控——例如，国际米兰的莫拉蒂和尤文图斯的阿涅利。

这样的所有权模式反映了俱乐部、地方社区及俱乐部拥有者商业利益之间的密切关系。不过，即便是这样，情况也正有所变化。意大利足球在几个方面都很挣扎：过度政治干预的传统，整体投资的不足以及意甲落后于英格兰及西班牙联赛的事实。

因此，我们近期看到了新一轮投资者进入意大利联赛的浪潮，如博洛尼亚、乌迪内斯和罗马的俱乐部等。后者由于目前正由美国企业家拥有并运营俱乐部而显得尤其重要。

在意大利掌控一家俱乐部并不困难，但目前仍有当地政府掌控球队体育场的情况。在这些地区，体育场馆带来的利润收益由当地政府说了算，而非俱乐部。从经济角度看，这对于俱乐部所有者而言是极大的约束，因此我们看到很多新的俱乐部所有者开始建造属于自己的场馆，或与当地政府就场馆控制权做着不懈斗争。尤文图斯是一个典型例子，罗马也是如此。

我们可以看到，在欧洲其他地方，足球已有新的所有权模式并对外国投资者们保持着开放。在法国，卡塔尔财团（卡塔尔体育投资基金——国家主权财富基金的一部分）收购了巴黎圣日耳曼。汽车制造商标致公司去年将索肖足球俱乐部转让给了中国投资者，摩纳哥足球俱乐部也在几年前被俄罗斯大亨收购。法国对俱乐部寻找新老板持开放态度，这对于投资者而言也是新的目标。

对比目前中国投资者已经进入的市场，欧洲可供投资的国家其实有很多，这其中包括荷兰和捷克，中国人已对荷兰的海牙ADO足球俱乐部和捷克的布拉格斯拉夫人足球俱乐部进行了收购。不过，无论是在哪个国家，对于未来俱乐部的所有者们都是一样的，你必须理解你想投资的这个国家的法律、政治、社会和文化环境。

➤英文原文：

In recent months there has been speculationthat both of Milan’s Serie A clubs – AC and Internazionale – have been subjectto interest from Chinese investors. It remains unclear whether the investorswant to buy the clubs outright or are seeking to take a stake in the clubs.

Chinese interest in such clubs isinevitable given the country’s positive predisposition towards Italianfootball, a relationship that was strongly forged back in the 1980s. Yet thespeculation comes in the wake of a spate of European club acquisitions byChinese investors and entrepreneurs.

Perhaps the most notable acquisitions havebeen the 13% stake in Manchester City, taken by CMC; and the 20% shareholdingin Atletico Madrid secured by the Wanda Corporation. But there have beenseveral other, outright club purchases including at Espanyol and Den Haag. ACor Internazionale could be next.

As China pursues its sport industry visionand its football goals, it is highly likely that we will see more European clubacquisitions. There are obvious reasons for this: at one level, Europeanfootball clubs can be revenue generating investment opportunities. At anotherlevel, buying a club contributes to a diversified business portfolio, somethingthat aligns with the conglomeration of some Chinese entertainment businesses.

Buying a club is also a good source ofbusiness intelligence, competence development and learning. If Chinese clubsare to learn how to successfully identify playing talent, build their marketingdepartments, understand how sponsorship deals work, engage fans and createexciting stadium facilities, then transferring knowledge from a European cluban investor owns makes a lot of sense.

But acquiring a European club is notstraightforward, it requires specific market intelligence as there are variousclub ownership models in place across Europe. These in turn are governed by differentownership rules in each country. Furthermore, it is worthwhile for prospectiveinvestors to note that no ownership guidelines are provided by FIFA, UEFA orthe EU.

Consider England as an example; the valueof clubs has risen dramatically over the last decade or so, as foreigninvestors have acquired clubs including Manchester United and City, Chelsea,Arsenal and Liverpool. Most clubs in England are constituted as private limitedcompanies, meaning football club shares can be bought and sold among smallgroups of people.

This means English clubs are relativelyeasy to acquire, providing the price is right and one can persuade the existingowners to sell. In theory, acquisition of an English club can be stopped ordelayed if a prospective owner fails a fit and proper person test. This testensures that a prospective owner actually does have the financial resourcesneeded to buy and run a football club.

There has been some criticism of the fitand proper person test, notably in the light of Carson Yeung’s purchase ofBirmingham City. While he passed the test, he was subsequently jailed in HongKong for money laundering offences. The stringency of the fit and proper persontest therefore remains open to question.

In Germany, the situation is rather morecomplex and restrictive than in England. Indeed, prospective Chinese investorsare currently unable to acquire outright control of a club because of Germanfootball’s ownership rules. Specifically, the 50+1 rule dictates that themajority of a club’s shares must remain in the hands of fans (hence, 50% + 1share).

Germany is therefore often held-up as anexample of good governance principles in football for the way in which itupholds fan interests and democracy. However, some in Germany are beginning toquestion the wisdom of such an ownership model as clubs in other Europeancountries forge ahead on the back of funds provided by overseas investors. Achange in regulations isn’t imminent, but it is worthwhile that investorsmonitor the situation.

Spanish football operates a system that isseemingly a hybrid of the English and German club ownership models: some clubsare privately owned, hence the recent purchases of Malaga and Espanyol byQatari and Chinese owners respectively. Other clubs such as Real Madrid andBarcelona are membership organisations. That is, they ate owned by fans whoeffectively take an ownership share in them by individually paying an annualmembership fee.

The situation at Real and Barca is unlikelyto change any time soon as it is written into each club’s constitution thatfans own the clubs. Any change in these constitutions would need fans to votein favour of it, which would be likely to create all manner of legal problems.Furthermore, in Barca’s case, the club is often held-up as being a model of fandemocracy and good governance. It is extremely unlikely that we will ever see achange in ownership at the blau grana.

It is worth keeping in mind too that clubownership in Spain is highly a highly politicised phenomenon, and is oftenlinked to the complexities of Spain regionalism and the country’s sometimesfractious history. Understanding the country’s socio-cultural landscape wouldthus seem to be an imperative for anyone considering purchase of a stake in aSpanish club.

In Italy, the situation is not dissimilarto that in England; unlike in Germany and Spain, fan ownership of clubs isuncommon. Instead, Italian football club ownership has historically been dominatedby industrial family ownership - for example, the Moratti’s at Internazionaleand the Agnelli’s at Juventus.

This pattern and model of ownership hasreflected the close relationship between clubs, local communities and thebusiness interests of club owners. However, the situation is now changing; Italianfootball has been struggling on several fronts notably in relation to its overlypolitical nature, a general lack of investment, and Serie A’s failure to keeppace with leagues in England and Spain.

Hence, we have recently seen a new wave of ownersentering the Italian game, at clubs such as Bologna, Udinese and Roma. Thelatter is particularly significant as American entrepreneurs now own and arerunning the club. While the controls on club ownership in Italian are notonerous, one issue is that local government often owns the stadiums in whichteams play.

In cases where this happens, localgovernment therefore own the revenue streams generated by the stadiums, not theclub. This is commercially restrictive for owners, hence we have seen the waveof new club owners seeking either to build their own stadiums, or to wrestlecontrol of stadiums from local government. Juventus is one example of this,Roma is another.

Elsewhere in Europe, we have seen footballopening-up to new ownership models and to foreign investors. In France, theQataris (through Qatar Sports Investment, part of the country’s sovereignwealth fund) purchased Paris Saint Germain. Just as significantly, Sochaux wassold last year by car manufacturers Peugeot to Chinese investors, while Monacowas bought several years ago by a Russian oligarch. It seems as though Francehas opened-up to the need for new club owners, and the country is thus apossible destination for inward football investment.

There are obviously more countries inEurope, into which Chinese investors have already moved. This includes Hollandand the Czech Republic, where Chinese citizens has bought Den Haag and SlaviaPrague respectively. Whichever the country might be however, the generallessons for prospective owners are the same: understand the legal, political,social and cultural environment into which you are planning to invest.

作者简介：西蒙·查德威克，任教于英国索尔福德大学，被聘为“92班“教授，教授“体育企业”，“体育战略”等课程。同时他还担任2022卡塔尔世界杯研究项目主任。与西蒙·查德威克教授合作过的世界顶级体育组织包括巴塞罗那足球俱乐部、欧足联、德国足球甲级联赛、阿迪达斯、米其林、国际网球联合会、德勤和Repucom。

Simon Chadwick is 'Class of 92' Professor of Sports Enterprise at Salford University Manchester and Director of Research for the 2022 Qatar World Cup. He has worked with many of the world's leading sports organisations including FC Barcelona, UEFA, the Bundesliga, Adidas, Michelin Motorsport, the International Tennis Federation, Deloitte and Repucom.

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声明：文中观点仅代表作者本人观点，不代表懒熊体育。